... In order for CEDR to be useful for analysts it must contain sensitive data about individuals such as medical information, job history, and educational background about individuals. On the other hand, there is a requirement that users of CEDR should not be allowed to infer confidential information about any specific individual represented in the database. This requirement appears in the SPEERA report as the following quotations show:
Section 5.4 -"Confidentiality protection must be provided for any data which contains personal identifiers" Section 5.6-"All researchers should have full access to a basic health data set that has full protection against the identification of individuals" "The Department should establish, such a database and set procedures for public access"
This conflict, between the individual's right to privacy and society's need to know and process information, is by no means specific to CEDR and has been the subject of research studies in the area of inference controls on statistical databases. The objective of these studies is to find ways to provide users of the database with aggregate statistics about the collection of entities represented in it while protecting the confidentiality of any individual entity.
The purpose of this document is to summarize the findings of recent studies on the security problem in statistical databases and examine their applicability to the specific needs of CEDR.
Organization
, The document is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe some general control methods which are available on most commercial database software. In Section 3 we provide a classification of statistical security methods. In Section 4 we analyze the type of users of CEDR and the security control methods which may be applied to each type. In Section 5 we summarize the findings of this study and recommend possible solutions.
2. Administrative and Software based controls 2.1. Administrative Controls.
Any technical solution to the security problem must be complemented by a system of administrative controls. Such controls include procedures by which users are given specific privileges with respect to the way they may use the database. In some cases such controls may allow only indirect access to the information or may require users to submit study proposals before any access privileges are granted.
In the following sections we will use the term DBA (database administrator) to refer to the person(s) whose duty is to implement and enforce both the administrative and technical controls.
Software Controls
Most database management software provide some built in mechanisms which can be used for statistical security controls. We list some of them in this section:
Authorization Each user who wishes to access the database will be identified by the system. Authorization tables will be maintained by the system to check permissions
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-3 -on each operation attempted by the user. Auditing-This is a feature which may be used to monitor user activity within a database system. For example, the DBA can monitor who used the database and ~hich tables were accessed. He can also monitor selective queries and record these results in an audit trail.
Permissions-Part of the standard query language are statements such as GRANT and REVOKE which allow the DBA to assign permissions to users to perform operations on tables such as access a The methods mentioned in the previous section are not enough to stop a sophisticated attempt to compromise the database which uses a sequence of queries for inference. This imposes some challenging requirements on the design of the query interface since a user may attempt to infer confidential information by correlating a sufficient number of summary answers. The user may also base his/her inference on some additional information available from external sources which is not explicitly stored in the database. As an example let us consider a database which holds information about AGE, SEX, EMPLOYER, and DIAGNOSIS of individuals. Let us assume that the value of DIAGNOSIS is confidential. Let PI be the predicate:
PI: (AGE=42 and SEX= Male and EMPLOYER =ABC) and suppose a counting query QI QI: COUNT (PI) returns the answer 1. We can then follow by second counting query Q2 where:
Q2: COUNT( PI and DIAGNOSIS = Lung Cancer)
In this case if the answer to Q2 is also 1, we establish a diagnosis for an individual, if it is 0 we can keep on trying other possibilities until we find the right one.
Even if we refuse to answer queries whose count is 1, the database can be • , . . , -5 -It is therefore important to ensure that no sequence of queries is sufficient to deduce private or confidential information about any individual. This task is not simple and requires query filters as well as some query logs which register which previous queries were submitted by users. In this section we survey some methods which provide security against such sophisticated attempts .
Modeling
As the previous section shows, in order to understand all the aspects of a statistical security system we need to model the following:
• Object Definition Construct A statistical database may contain data about different objects, i.e., workers, facilities, treatments etc. The security control mechanisms should take into account the security requirements of each of these objects and their subcategories. 
• User Knowledge Construct
We need to keep track of the knowledge properties of each group of users. These propertiers include existing knowledge and also knowledge gained bya chain of previous queries.
• Constraint Enforcer and Checker This is the process which intercepts queries which are submitted to the database and enforces the security mechanisms associated with them. In case the query is performed successfully, it also 'updates the information the system maintains about user knowledge.
Maintaining the above constructs seems to be a very difficult task and to the best of our knowledge has not been implemented in any existing system. However, they provide a framework against which current systems can be compared and measured.
Classification of Methods
It is agreed by most researchers in the field that privacy protection schemes are acceptable only if they are both effective and efficient. A method is effective if it provides statistical security to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the richness of information available to the users. It is efficient if it does not cause significant performance degradation.
There are many protection policies suggested in the literature which claim to satisfy the above constraints. In general they can be classified as follows:
• Query Restriction -This is a family of methods which limit the type of queries allowed. The main methods here are: query-set-size control, query overlap control, aUditing, cell suppression and database partitioning.
• Perturbing the database-Changing the values of the real database by small variations and making only the perturbed database available to users. For example, to avoid some possibility of inference about individuals, we may maintain information such as date of birth, job classification years of education etc. in approximate form, e.g., instead of complete date of birth month-dayyear we can store only year. Other possibilities include rounding and maintaining ranges for each value rather than the value itself. Encryption can also be viewed as a perturbation method although no loss in precision is incurred in this case. All perturbation methods must be implemented carefully as to ensure that the data is precise enough for analysis purposes.
• Perturbing outputs-Changing the answers slightly without changing the actual database. All database perturbation methods mentioned above, can also be used only for output perturbation. For example it can be shown that by adding or subtracting a small constant from answers which include counters, the chances of compromising the database reduce significantly without affecting statistical validity. Another possibility is to supply only results based on random samples .
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-7 -from the database rather than answers based on the population itself. For example if a user asks what is the average age of a group of workers based on some criterion, the database computes a random sample_from that group and gives the sample average as all answer.
In most cases, a security control strategy combines one or more of the above methods.
In Table 1 , we summarize the different methods and rank them based on the implementation efforts needed and the loss of precision to the database in case they are adopted.
The Lattice Model
Most of the methods of type query restriction can be explained within a framework which is commonly mentioned in the research literature called the lattice model. Another method combines cells together to avoid cells with low counts; In Figure 4 this is shown where two education levels (6 and 7) are combined into a single column.
Another example is that of substituting ranges instead of exact values as shown in Fig- ure 5.
Implementation of security control methods in CEDR
Any database security strategy must take into account the nature of the confidential information which must be protected as well as system user profiles.
Based on our interviews, we envision at least three types of users for CEDR: 1) Database Administrators: Users who are responsible for accepting new data to CEDR and enforce integrity controls in order to maintain it in a reliable state. In order to perform their tasks they will be allowed to insert, delete and modify any portion of the database.
2) Analysts: Researchers who perform epidemiological studies on the population stored in CEDR. These researchers will typically perform statistical analysis of the data. In addition, they need access to individual records in order to ensure consistency and accuracy of such records. They will be allowed to do so as long as individual identifiers are not revealed to them. In addition, such -10 -users will also submit data for possible inclusion in the database.
3) Casual Users: These are users who propose to conduct studies on the database. They will be allowed to perform statistical studies and retrieve aggregate information but will not have permission to view any individual records. They will also be allowed to browse the metadata.
We assume that effective access control mechanisms will be implemented in CEDR to avoid unauthorized access to the system. Such controls include identification and authentication of each person seeking access to CEDR as well as hislher user type.
Our main effort will therefore be directed at avoiding'improper use of the database by authorized users who try to access or infer confidential information from data available to them according to their user type.
Most of our protection efforts will be directed against users of type 2 and 3.
Such users will typically work in two stages: In stage 1 they extract some subset of records from the database and in stage 2 proceed to manipulate these records with a statistical package such as SAS or MOX. It is almost impossible to provide any protection in stage 2 and therefore we need to control the data extracted from the database in stage 1.
In Table 2 we summarize the user types, their access requirements and the type of controls which are appropriate for them.
s. Summary and recommendations
• Privacy protection policy consists of administrative and technical components .
• The administrative component includes a user classification policy and procedures for assigning database access privileges.
• The technical component is carried out by database administrators who are f' " -11 -responsible for database design, creation of views, control of query types etc.
• Privacy protection will incur costs in implementation efforts and performance degradation of the database • Tradeoffs exist between the level of protection and the implementation effort and richness of data available to users.
• Identifying variables (e.g. dates, age) could be presented with minimum amount of accuracy to minimize the risk of identification.
Recommendations
Our recommendations are summarized in Table 3 . The controls we suggest are based on user types and also take into account the cost of implementation. Three user type categories are sufficient, a user will be classified by administrative procedures and authentication will be provided by the software. Under the assumption that loss in precision is unacceptable we eliminated all perturbation methods which lead to such loss from consideration. From the remaining methods we recommend using administrative controls to the maximum degree possible and technical controls which can be , .
implemented at a low or mOderate cost. 
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